ABSTRACT: I examine whether firms alter their behavior in response to changes in accounting standards that mandate new financial statement disclosures. While prior research suggests that new recognition rules lead to changes in firm behavior, there is limited evidence that disclosure rules can impact firm behavior. This study helps to fill this void in the literature by examining the economic consequences of the mandated disclosures of pension asset composition required under SFAS 132R. Under pension accounting rules, the composition of pension assets is a key determinant of the assumed expected rate of return (ERR) on pension assets. I find that when firms disclose asset composition for the first time under SFAS 132R, firms that were previously using upwardbiased ERRs respond by increasing asset allocation to high-risk securities and/or reducing the ERR assumption. While disclosure requirements arguably create less powerful incentives to alter firm decisions than recognition requirements, these findings offer evidence that firms alter behavior in response to disclosure standards.
I. INTRODUCTION
P rior research suggests that changes in accounting recognition standards lead firms to alter some types of transactions (Mittelstaedt et al. 1995; Graham et al. 2005; Bens and Monahan 2008; Choudhary et al. 2008; Zhang 2009; Amir et al. 2010 ). However, these prior studies focus on accounting standards mandating recognition, as opposed to disclosure. Disclosure requirements arguably create less powerful incentives to alter firm decisions than recognition requirements. The purpose of my study is to examine whether firms alter their behavior in response to accounting standards that mandate new financial statement disclosures.
My study empirically examines this question using defined benefit pension accounting as a research setting. 1 In particular, I examine whether firms alter behavior in response to the mandated disclosure of pension asset composition under SFAS 132R (FASB 2003) . The content of the SFAS 132R disclosure requirement is economically important because it relates to an assumption affecting net income. The expected rate of return (ERR) assumption determines the expected return on pension assets and, all else equal, a higher assumed ERR results in higher reported earnings. Although SFAS 132R only changes disclosure requirements for the allocation of pension assets among various investment categories, this allocation is a key determinant of the ERR. Therefore, I predict that the disclosure of the asset allocation constrains the ability to manage earnings using the ERR.
Because of its importance, the ERR has always been subject to scrutiny. During the early 2000s, some financial analysts and regulators speculated that firms' ERR assumptions were unrealistically high. In 2002, the SEC publicly warned companies that it might challenge ERRs above 9 percent (Bloomberg Businessweek Magazine 2004) . Then in 2003, the FASB issued SFAS 132R to require disclosure of the percentage composition of pension assets among major investment categories.
I hypothesize that firms previously using upward-biased ERRs respond to SFAS 132R by a combination of increasing the proportion of pension assets allocated to high-risk investments to justify the inflated ERR and reducing the ERR assumption to reflect the true riskiness of the pension assets. I predict that the magnitudes of these responses depend on the extent to which the pre-SFAS 132R ERR is higher than justified by pension asset composition.
I begin by constructing a proxy to measure the extent to which the pre-SFAS 132R ERR is higher than that justified by pension asset composition. My proxy is derived from a model that estimates firms' ERRs as a function of their reported pension asset allocation. Specifically, I regress the ERR on the proportions of pension assets invested in various categories of securities. I assume that SFAS 132R reduces the opportunity for firms to report ERRs that are not justified by their asset composition, such that there is greater alignment between the ERR and asset composition in the period after SFAS 132R. Based on this assumption, I use all firm-years after SFAS 132R to obtain parameter estimates that describe the unbiased relation between the ERR and asset composition. Using these parameter estimates, I then compute prediction errors in the year before SFAS 132R for 1 Unless otherwise stated, all references to pension plans hereafter refer to defined benefit plans only. In a defined benefit (DB) plan, the employee's pension benefit is determined by a formula that takes into account the years of service, salary, age at retirement, and other factors. In contrast, in a defined contribution (DC) plan, contributions are paid into an individual account for each participant, and contributions are invested and credited to the individual's account. The employer (employee) bears the investment risk under DB (DC) plans. DB pensions in the U.S. have $2 trillion in aggregate pension assets under management, and in 2008 approximately 25 percent of firms on Compustat had DB pensions. Firms with DB plans are economically significant as the aggregate market capitalization of firms with DB pensions represents 68 percent of the total market capitalization of all firms on Compustat.
each firm as a measure of the portion of the ERR that is not explained by pension asset allocation. For simplicity, I hereafter refer to this measure as the unexplained ERR. My research design uses cross-sectional regressions, where the changes in firm behavior are measured in the fiscal years immediately before and after the issuance of SFAS 132R. Because the two firm responses of interest are potentially simultaneously determined, I use two-stage least squares, where the dependent variables are the change in ERR and the change in asset allocation, and the independent variable of interest is the unexplained ERR.
Consistent with my predictions, I find that both firm responses are associated with the unexplained ERR. In particular, when disclosure of asset composition in financial statements is required for the first time under SFAS 132R, firms whose pre-SFAS 132R ERRs are higher than justified by their pension asset composition respond to SFAS 132R by increasing their asset allocation to high-risk securities and/or reducing their ERRs. Furthermore, I find that the magnitudes of both responses are positively associated with the upward bias in the pre-SFAS 132R ERR.
These findings make an important contribution to the literature on managerial responses to accounting standards. Specifically, the results from this study are consistent with the idea that firms are willing to undertake ''real'' actions in order to report favorable accounting information (Graham et al. 2005 ). My study complements prior studies that examine whether firms alter their behavior in response to changes in accounting standards related to recognition rules (Mittelstaedt et al. 1995; Bens and Monahan 2008; Choudhary et al. 2008; Zhang 2009; Amir et al. 2010) by extending the research question to disclosure rules.
The distinction between recognition and disclosure is important. Prior accounting research has documented differences between amounts recognized in financial statements and amounts disclosed in footnotes with respect to several dimensions, such as value relevance (Barth 1991; Hann et al. 2007 ) and the level of auditor tolerance for misstatements (Libby et al. 2006 ). In addition, Amir and Ziv (1997) model a firm's decision between recognition and disclosure under early adoption of SFAS 106 and find evidence that firms do not view recognition and disclosure as equivalent because of contracting effects. Therefore, while prior studies find that firms alter their behavior in response to changes in recognition rules, these prior studies do not address the question of whether firms alter their behavior in response to changes in disclosure rules. SFAS 132R offers a natural experiment for studying the effects of accounting standards on firm behavior. SFAS 132R was largely unanticipated by firms (as discussed in Section II), such that the effects of the rule change are likely concentrated in the year of the rule change. In the first year of SFAS 132R, firms are required to disclose historical pension asset allocations in addition to current-year information. Because firms did not anticipate SFAS 132R, the historical asset allocations represent the allocations chosen by firms in the absence of mandated disclosure of pension asset composition. I exploit the features of SFAS 132R to construct a control sample that is not subject to the mandated disclosure of asset allocation.
In robustness tests, I examine a potential alternative explanation. As with any test of changes over time, a limitation to my study is that there may be potential confounding events concurrent with SFAS 132R. Therefore, it is possible that the firm responses observed in my study are driven by events other than the issuance of SFAS 132R. Specifically, I examine whether the observed managerial responses are driven by a warning issued by the SEC that it might challenge unreasonable pension assumptions. The results of the robustness tests support the main findings that the firm responses are attributable to SFAS 132R.
Section II motivates the study and describes the relevant FASB accounting standards for DB pensions. Section III develops hypotheses. Section IV describes the data and empirical methods. Section V discusses results and robustness tests. Section VI concludes.
II. MOTIVATION Firm Responses to Accounting Rules
Several prior studies provide evidence that firms alter some types of transactions in response to changes in accounting standards. Zhang (2009) finds that firms reduce their speculative use of derivative instruments after SFAS 133 required recognition of all derivatives as either assets or liabilities at fair value. Choudhary et al. (2008) document that firms accelerate the vesting of employee stock options to avoid recognizing unvested option grants at fair value under SFAS 123R. Bens and Monahan (2008) find that banks reduce their investments in asset-backed commercial paper and enter into costly restructuring arrangements to avoid off-balance sheet consolidation under FIN 46. Mittelstaedt et al. (1995) document that the reductions in retiree health care benefits are associated with the adoption of SFAS 106, which requires the recognition of underfunded health care liabilities. Imhoff and Thomas (1988) find a substitution from capital leases to operating leases after SFAS 13 required the recognition of capital leases on the balance sheet. Beatty (1995) documents that firms that early-adopt SFAS 115 alter their investment behavior. Horwitz and Kolodny (1980) find a reduction in R&D spending after SFAS 2 required R&D to be expensed. Prior literature has also examined firm responses to accounting standards related to pensions. Amir et al. (2010) find that firms shift pension assets from equities to bonds after the required balance sheet recognition of the pension-funding status under SFAS 158 and FRS 17 in the U.S. and U.K., respectively.
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My study differs from these prior studies, primarily by examining a setting in which only disclosure requirements change. Disclosure requirements arguably create less powerful incentives to alter firm decisions than recognition requirements.
3 A finding that changes in disclosure requirements alone are enough to induce meaningful changes in firm behavior would offer compelling evidence in support of the idea that firms do alter their behavior in response to changes in accounting standards. My study contributes to the literature on the effects of accounting regulation by extending the research question to accounting standards that only mandate disclosure.
Pension Accounting as a Research Setting
SFAS 132R, Employers' Disclosures about Pensions and Other Postretirement Benefits, offers a unique natural experiment with several advantages for studying the effects of accounting standards on firm behavior. First, the consequences resulting from the rule change are likely concentrated and observable in the year that the accounting standard was issued. SFAS 132R became effective quickly because the FASB believed that most of the disclosure requirements would be ''readily available in firms' existing information systems'' (SFAS 132R, }A28). The FASB added a project on pension disclosures to its technical agenda in March 2003, issued an Exposure Draft in September 2003, and 2 When FRS 17 was issued in the U.K., it was a disclosure standard for three years before becoming a recognition standard. However, the eventual transition from disclosure to recognition was one of FRS 17's stated goals at the time of issuance. FRS 17 ''allows for a long implementation period, with disclosures building up in the notes to the accounts'' (FRS 17, ASB 2000, }57 in Appendix IV). At issuance, firms were aware that FRS 17 would eventually require recognition of the funding status. Therefore, the economic consequences documented by Amir et al. (2010) could be due to firms' response to the recognition rule, as opposed to the disclosure rule. My research setting using SFAS 132R pertains to a standard that alters disclosure only. 3 I assume that auditors check for the reasonableness of the ERR prior to SFAS 132R but more rigorously test whether the ERR is supported by the asset allocation after SFAS 132R because of higher litigation risk for information actually published in the 10-K. This assumption is consistent with Libby et al. (2006) , who find that auditors permit more misstatements in disclosed, as opposed to recognized, amounts. Extending this logic, I expect that auditors permit more misstatements in amounts that do not even appear in financial statements as opposed to disclosed amounts.
the disclosure requirements became effective for fiscal years ending after December 15, 2003. Thus, firms likely did not anticipate SFAS 132R's new required disclosures before the final issuance of the standard. 4 Second, SFAS 132R mandates that the ''disclosures for earlier annual periods presented for comparative purposes should be restated for the percentages of each major category of plan assets held'' (SFAS 132R, page 3 of Summary), such that in the first year that SFAS 132R was effective, prior-year asset composition was required to be disclosed in addition to current-year asset composition. Because firms likely did not anticipate SFAS 132R, they likely did not expect that the prior-year asset allocations would be disclosed in the financial statements. Thus, the historical asset allocations represent asset allocations chosen by firms in the absence of mandated disclosure of pension asset composition to justify their ERRs. In my empirical design, I exploit these features of SFAS 132R and use the historical asset allocations to construct a control sample that is not subject to the mandated disclosure rules. Third, SFAS 132R only alters disclosure requirements without any contemporaneous changes to recognition or measurement rules. The absence of such changes reduces the potential confounding effects that are attributable to recognition or measurement instead of disclosure. Fourth, pensions offer an interesting setting with large and economically meaningful effects to study the consequences of accounting standards.
As in prior studies examining the economic consequences of accounting standards, SFAS 132R is not necessarily the sole cause of changes in managerial behavior related to pensions. It is important to consider other factors that can concurrently affect changes in managerial behavior. For instance, actual pension asset returns and the overall equity market performance can contribute to the observed changes in ERR and/or asset allocation, even in the absence of managerial responses to SFAS 132R. As discussed in Section IV, I empirically control for these other factors to examine whether the impact of SFAS 132R on managerial behavior is incremental to other factors that can potentially influence firm decisions related to pensions.
Institutional Background for Pension Accounting (SFAS 132R and SFAS 87)
SFAS 132R, Employers' Disclosures about Pensions and Other Postretirement Benefits, provides disclosure guidelines for the plan assets and obligations for firms with pension plans. SFAS 132R became effective for fiscal years ending after December 15, 2003 and revises the disclosures originally mandated by SFAS 132, which took effect for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1997. The revised standard requires annual disclosure of the percentage composition of major categories of pension plan asset allocation (i.e., equities, bonds, real estate, and other), along with narrative descriptions of investment strategies and the basis used to determine the overall expected long-term rate of return on assets. includes an example of pension asset allocation using these four broad categories, and firms typically interpret the examples provided by FASB as required disclosures and use them as templates when preparing their financial statements (Zion and Carache 2005) . Also, SFAS 132R requires other new annual disclosures, which are not the focus of my study, including: accumulated benefit obligation (this disclosure had been eliminated under the original SFAS 132); target allocations of each plan asset category for companies that use target allocations; benefits expected to be paid in each of the next five fiscal years and in the aggregate for the five fiscal years thereafter; the best estimate of contributions expected to be paid to the plan during the next fiscal year; separate statement of the assumptions used to determine the benefit obligation and the net benefit cost; and the measurement dates used to determine assets and benefit obligations. SFAS 132R also requires disclosure of the separate components of net pension cost and estimated and actual contributions to pension plans in interim financial reports.
SFAS 132R only enhances disclosure and does not change the measurement or recognition rules under SFAS 87, Employers' Accounting for Pensions (FASB 1985) . The pension cost computed under SFAS 87 includes three main components: (1) service cost, (2) interest cost, and (3) expected return on pension plan assets, which is the product of the ERR assumed by management and the fair value of pension plan assets. 6 To mitigate concerns about the volatility of returns on pension assets, SFAS 87 allows firms to use expected returns, rather than actual returns, and differences between expected and actual returns are amortized over time using the ''corridor'' approach.
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III. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
According to pension accounting rules, the expected return on pension assets offsets the service cost and interest cost when computing pension expense, such that a higher ERR assumption results in higher reported earnings. Changes in the ERR can result in economically significant changes in reported earnings. Zion and Carache (2002) estimate that aggregate profits for the S&P 500 firms with DB plans would decline by an estimated $44 billion in 2003 alone if these firms lowered their ERR to 6.5 percent.
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Prior research has examined the use of pension assumptions to manage earnings (Bergstresser et al. 2006) , and using the ERR to manage earnings appears to be effective because the market does not fully impound pension information (Picconi 2006; Franzoni and Marin 2006) . In the years preceding SFAS 132R, some analysts and regulators speculated that ERRs were too high when compared to historical returns in equity and bond markets. For instance, a J.P. Morgan Asset Management investment strategist argued in a 2002 Fortune article that a far more reasonable assumption for returns would be between 6.5 percent and 7 percent, given the widely held expectations for stock and bond performance for the next 20 years (Revell 2002) . In December 2002, the SEC publicly warned companies that it might challenge rate-of-return assumptions above 9 percent. In October 2004, the SEC launched an investigation into six companies regarding their pension assumptions. ''Among other things, we're looking to see if companies have reverse-engineered the rates to get to a certain financial result,'' said Kenneth Lench, an assistant director in the SEC's enforcement division (Stuart 2005) . 9 SFAS 132R requires annual disclosure of the percentage composition of major categories of pension plan assets, which allows users to assess the reasonableness of the ERR with respect to the riskiness of the pension assets' investment categories. Bergstresser et al. (2006) find that managers use asset allocations to justify their ERRs, but Amir and Benartzi (1998) find that the ERR is only 6 Other components include: the amortization of unrecognized prior service costs, which represent retroactive benefits earned prior to the year of initiating or amending a DB plan; the amortization of gains or losses from the effects of changing actuarial assumptions and differences between actual and expected return on plan assets; and the amortization of unrecognized net obligation or asset existing before the adoption of SFAS 87. 7 Under the corridor approach, the cumulative unrecognized net gain or loss in excess of a ''corridor'' defined as 10 percent of the greater of the projected benefit obligation or the market value of plan assets is the minimum amount amortized. 8 The most controversial and contentious assumption is the ERR (Zion and Carache 2005) . I focus on the ERR as the major assumption available for managers to manipulate pension expense, although there are other important pension assumptions, including the discount rate, salary inflation rate, mortality, employee turnover, and retirement age. 9 The six companies were Boeing, Delphi, Ford, General Motors, Navistar, and Northwest Airlines. Although this sample is too small to conduct any formal statistical tests, the business press has indicated that these firms have suffered losses in market value as a result of the SEC investigation. In fact, on the day that General Motors publicly acknowledged the SEC investigation, the company's stock price declined by 7 percent over the course of one day (Bruno 2005) .
''weakly'' related to asset allocation. Both of these studies use pre-SFAS 132R samples. I predict that the mandated disclosure of asset composition constrains the opportunity for firms to report ERRs that are not justified by actual asset allocations. If firms report upward-biased ERRs prior to SFAS 132R, then I predict that they reduce the bias after SFAS 132R, thereby strengthening the relation between ERR and asset composition.
H1:
Firms that use inflated ERRs prior to SFAS 132R are more likely to increase their asset allocation to higher-risk securities after SFAS 132R.
H2:
Firms that use inflated ERRs prior to SFAS 132R are more likely to decrease their ERRs after SFAS 132R.
My maintained assumption is that opportunistic firms react to the new FASB requirement to disclose pension asset allocation in the 10-K, despite the fact that some firms were already disclosing asset composition prior to SFAS 132R. There are three alternative sources of pension asset allocation information prior to SFAS 132R.
The first source comes directly from firms' annual reports. Prior to SFAS 132R, SFAS 87 acknowledged the importance of asset allocation disclosures (SFAS 87, }54), but did not enforce the disclosures. As a result, some firms voluntarily disclosed asset allocation. Amir and Benartzi (1998) examine voluntary pension asset allocation disclosures under SFAS 87 for a sample of 27 firms. In their sample (Amir and Benartzi 1998, Appendix) , most firms either do not disclose pension asset allocation at all or provide only a qualitative list of the general asset categories. Only two firms in their sample disclose the percentage composition of pension assets, which is the format mandated under SFAS 132R.
The second source of asset allocation information is IRS Form 5500, which is a required filing under ERISA for pension plans with more than 100 participants. While Form 5500 contains a larger list of finer asset categories than under SFAS 132R, firms report a majority of their assets on Form 5500 in categories labeled as ''common/collective trusts'' or ''master trust investment accounts.'' For instance, 56 percent of DB assets for all firms that filed Form 5500 in 2007 were collectively classified as assets held in common/collective trusts or master trusts. 10 Another issue is that a firm may have pension plans operating under different tax filer identifiers, making it difficult for analysts and investors to aggregate all the plans for a given firm, as under SFAS 132R. Furthermore, there is a two-year lag between the filing date and the time when the forms become publicly available (Jin et al. 2006) . The lag time reduces the likelihood that managers feel pressure to have asset compositions that support the ERR. For these reasons, Form 5500 is unlikely to be a direct substitute for the SFAS 132R disclosures. Nevertheless, I reperform my main tests using Form 5500 data; the untabulated results (discussed in Section V) support the idea that SFAS 132R provides incremental information to Form 5500.
The third source is proprietary databases, through which some firms voluntarily disclose pension asset composition. One of the most prominent databases is compiled by Pensions & Investments (P&I) . Approximately 600 of the 1,000 plans covered by P&I are corporate pensions, representing less than half of the 1,300 firms on average per year in Compustat that have pensions during my sample period. There are no assurances that firms disclose truthfully to the proprietary databases. Furthermore, similar to IRS Form 5500, P&I is also not a timely source; P&I typically has a one-year lag.
11 In summary, while these three sources provide important information prior to SFAS 132R, it is likely that SFAS 132R provides incremental information that allows users to better evaluate the validity of the ERR.
It is possible that the disclosures available prior to SFAS 132R provide sufficiently strong incentives for firms to report ERRs consistent with asset allocation. Under this scenario, the ERR and asset composition would already be aligned prior to SFAS 132R, and there would not be significant changes in firm behavior when asset composition is disclosed for the first time in financial statements (i.e., results would not support H1 and H2).
IV. DATA AND EMPIRICAL DESIGN
My sample consists of the Compustat universe of U.S. firms with DB pensions. More specifically, I require nonmissing ERR, actual returns to pension assets, pension assets, pension liabilities, and pension asset allocation data. I further impose the criterion that the pension asset allocation percentages sum to 100 percent, after I manually adjust for rounding errors. During the first year that SFAS 132R was effective, firms disclose historical prior-year asset allocations in addition to the current-year allocations. I hand-collect the historical allocations from the financial statements in the first year that SFAS 132R is effective.
The asset allocations used in my study represent actual asset allocations as opposed to long-term target allocations. As a practical matter, I cannot use target allocations, which are not available for the year before SFAS 132R because SFAS 132R did not mandate target allocation disclosures for a past period. It would be conceptually appealing to use target asset allocations because they represent long-term average asset allocations and theoretically might be more closely aligned (relative to actual allocations) with the ERR. Actual allocations are specific to a particular point in time (i.e., the end of the fiscal period) and, therefore, can be affected by realized returns during the period, so they might not map well into the ERR. However, there are shortcomings associated with target allocations. Because they represent ''targets,'' firms can have large deviations between their target allocations and actual allocations without showing any evidence of long-term convergence. Furthermore, target allocations are not verifiable, whereas actual allocations are. For my study, I use actual asset allocations.
To construct a proxy for the alignment between the ERR and asset allocation, I first identify firms that are likely using inflated ERRs to manage earnings in the year prior to SFAS 132R. I assume that ERRs are explained by pension asset composition (SFAS 87, }45). I regress the ERR on the proportions of the firms' pension assets invested in equities, bonds, real estate, and other unspecified securities.
12 Specifically, I regress ERR in year tþ1 on asset allocation percentages in year t, because firms choose the ERR at the beginning of the fiscal year based on asset allocation at the end of the prior fiscal year. An alternative but equivalent perspective for the latter statement is that firms choose ERRs at the end of the previous fiscal year based on asset allocation at the end of the previous fiscal year. 13 Thus, the ERR in year tþ1 is based on asset allocation at the end of year t. I also control for the effect of actual returns to pension assets, measured as the actual dollar return scaled by beginning plan assets (ARR), which can also influence the choice of ERR. Because the choice of ERR is likely affected by multiple prior years' actual returns, I include the average ARR for the three years ending in year t (ARR_AVG3YEAR).
14 Last, I include industry indicator variables because some firms state that they use peer data when establishing the ERR. I follow the industry classification based on Biddle and Seow (1991) and Mittelstaedt et al. (1995) :
Because SFAS 132R reduces the opportunity to report biased ERRs, I use all firm-years after SFAS 132R as an estimation period to obtain parameter estimates that describe the relation between ERR and asset composition in the absence of earnings management. Then, using the parameters from my estimation period, I compute prediction errors for each firm as a measure of the portion of the firm's pre-SFAS 132R ERR that is not explained by the pension asset allocation (hereafter, the unexplained ERR: UNEXPL_ERR).
15 More positive prediction errors suggest that the firm is using an ERR higher than the ERRs of other firms with similar pension asset compositions in the year immediately before SFAS 132R. To validate the proxy for the unexplained ERR, I manually check the values of the unexplained ERR for the six companies targeted by the SEC for aggressive pension assumptions (discussed in Section III). I find that the values of the unexplained ERR for these six companies are among the highest values in the cross-section for 2002 and 2003. Next, I model the firm's response to SFAS 132R as a joint decision to allocate more pension assets to risky investments and/or to reduce the reported ERR to correct the pre-SFAS 132R upward bias in ERR.
16 I use equity holdings to proxy for risky investments, because equities historically have the highest mean and variance in returns among the four categories in Equation (1). Specifically, I measure the change in equity allocation (D%EQUITIES) and the change in ERR (DERR) around SFAS 132R. The timeline below illustrates how the issuance of SFAS 132R overlaps with the chronology of when asset allocation and the ERR are disclosed by a typical December 31 year-end firm: 13 The following example illustrates how firms choose the ERR at the beginning of the fiscal year (or equivalently, at the end of the prior fiscal year) based on asset allocation at the end of the prior fiscal year. In its 2002 annual report, Consolidated Edison states: ''In addition, the Company has lowered its expected annual asset return for the plans for 2003 to 8.8 percent '' (Consolidated Edison 2002, 27) . Thus, at the end of 2002, the company chooses its 2003 ERR based on asset allocation at the end of 2002. 14 Instead of the three-year average ARR, I could use one-year ARR. Untabulated results for the yearly regressions of Equation (1) show that the coefficient on one-year ARR is negative for several years, likely due to the higher variability in one-year ARR. 15 Alternatively, I can compute in-sample residuals for the year prior to SFAS 132R. However, as discussed later in Table 2 , the R 2 and parameter estimates in 2002 are different from the pattern of those in all other years. One likely explanation is that the ERR and asset composition are misaligned because of instances of unrealistic ERRs assumed in 2002. Thus, using 2003 to 2008 as an out-of-sample estimation period more likely results in parameter estimates that more effectively measure the relation between the ERR and asset composition when earnings management is constrained. 17 Also denoted on the timeline are the two SEC actions discussed earlier. In December 2002, the SEC publicly warned that it might challenge ERRs above 9 percent. In October 2004, the SEC launched an investigation into the pension assumptions of six firms. As illustrated by the timeline, the October 2004 event is unlikely to explain the changes in asset allocation and ERR around SFAS 132R. However, it is possible that firms' delayed response to the December 2002 event might explain the observed changes. I address this alternative explanation in Section V.
I examine both changes in asset allocation and ERR in response to SFAS 132R. In Section V, descriptive statistics show that changes in asset allocation are more common than changes in ERR. Nonetheless, I examine both changes because they are likely jointly determined by a firm. Due to the joint nature of the decision, I use two-stage least squares. 18 In the first stage, I separately regress D%EQUITIES and DERR on a set of instruments.
19 I obtain the fitted values DERR_HAT and D%EQUITIES_HAT from the first-stage regressions. In the second stage, I estimate Equations (2) and (3) below using DERR_HAT and D%EQUITIES_HAT, respectively, as explanatory variables along with other control variables: H1 predicts that firms that use inflated ERRs prior to SFAS 132R are more likely to increase their asset allocation toward equity securities after SFAS 132R (c1 . 0 in Equation (2)). H2 predicts that firms that use inflated ERRs prior to SFAS 132R are more likely to reduce ERRs after SFAS 132R (d1 , 0 in Equation (3)). I expect c2 . 0 and d2 . 0 in the equations above if firms use reductions in ERR and increases in risky asset allocation as substitute mechanisms to correct the pre-SFAS 132R upward bias in ERRs.
Equation (2) controls for several other determinants of pension asset allocation. First, actual returns to the pension assets during the fiscal year can influence the ending balance of a firm's asset allocation. I control for the contemporaneous actual returns to pension assets ARR, measured as the actual dollar return scaled by beginning plan assets. Second, Harrison and Sharpe (1983) analytically show that firms should either (1) overfund the pension and invest in bonds to maximize the tax benefits of holding bonds or (2) underfund the pension and invest in equities to maximize the value of the put option provided by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) on unfunded obligations. Thus, the funding level can impact the optimal asset allocation. I measure prior-year FUNDING as (Plan Assets À PBO)/MVE. Third, to match pension assets and obligations, plans with young (old) employees can invest more in stocks (bonds) because stocks are more correlated with salary increases than bonds.
20 Following Amir et al. (2010) , I measure prior-year HORIZON as log (PBO/service cost). Fourth, firms tend to offset high operating risk by investing more in bonds (Friedman 1983; Bodie et al. 1987) . I measure OPER_RISK as the book value-deflated standard deviation of operating earnings from the past five years, ending in the prior year. Fifth, firms subject to higher tax rates have greater incentives to allocate pension assets to bonds, which are more heavily taxed (Amir et al. 2010) . Following Graham (1996) , I measure prior-year TAX as the simulated marginal tax rate before interest expense obtained from John Graham's website. 21 Sixth, if a firm does not actively rebalance its pension asset mix and the returns to its high-risk assets outperform returns to its low-risk assets, then the relative ending balances of asset values will appear as if the firm shifted assets toward high-risk securities, and vice versa. I include contemporaneous stock (bond) market returns as proxies for the performance of the firm's high-risk (low-risk) pension assets. I measure EQUITY_RET as annual returns to the CRSP value-weighted market index and BOND_RET as returns to the Vanguard Total Bond Market Index, both measured during the fiscal year.
Next, I control for the following determinants of ERR in Equation (3). First, it is possible that firms alter their ERRs in response to prior actual returns to pension assets. Thus, I control for average ARR computed for three years ending in the most recent year observed before the ERR is chosen (ARR_AVG3YEAR). While one-year ARR affects the year-end asset allocation, the choice of ERR is likely determined by multiple prior years' ARR. Second, the SEC warned in 2002 that it might challenge rate-of-return assumptions above 9 percent. Due to its limited resources, the SEC is more likely to investigate large, publicly visible firms and firms with significant DB plans. To avoid 20 The idea of allocating pension assets according to the age of the workforce is an alternative to the all-bonds optimal allocation strategies under Black (1980 ), Tepper (1981 , and Merton (2006), who do not take the age of the workforce into account. 21 The marginal tax rate is the tax rate that applies to the last dollar of the tax base and is often applied to the change in a firm's tax obligation as income rises. The simulated tax rates account for many important features of the tax code including uncertainty about taxable income, deferred taxes, the progressivity of the statutory tax schedule, net operating loss carryforwards and carrybacks, certain tax credits, and the alternative minimum tax. The simulated tax rates are based on consolidated financial statement data and use the assumption that worldwide net income is taxed at the top U.S. statutory rate. Therefore, the simulated marginal tax rates will be measured with error for firms that face a different tax rate on foreign income. These errors could influence the results observed in my study, because the pensions in my study primarily pertain to a firm's U.S. operations.
SEC scrutiny, these types of firms are more likely to reduce ERRs, even if their ERRs might not be unreasonable with respect to asset composition. I measure prior-year firm size (FIRM_SIZE) as the log of market value of equity and prior-year pension size (DB_SIZE) as the log of PBO. Third, firms likely incorporate prevailing interest rates into their estimates of ERR, where increases in interest rates lead to increases in expected returns. I obtain monthly AAA-rated corporate bond interest rates from the Federal Reserve, and measure the contemporaneous change in interest rates during the fiscal year (DINTEREST_RATE). Fourth, under SFAS 87, the ERR represents the long-term expected (future) rate of return, such that ERRs are higher when managers are optimistic about the future performance of their investments. I proxy for expected future returns using realized future returns, under the assumption of perfect foresight. I measure future realized returns as the three-year returns to the CRSP value-weighted market index in the three years beginning after the current fiscal year (EQUITY_RET_EXP). 22 Fifth, to avoid public scrutiny, a firm with an ERR above those of its peer firms can reduce the ERR. I measure ERR_LESS_PEER_AVG as the firm's prior-year ERR minus the prior-year industry mean ERR.
For clarity, I briefly summarize the timing of each variable. The dependent variables in Equations (2) and (3) 
V. RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1, Panel A presents descriptive statistics for my sample during 2002 to 2008. Except for the asset allocation percentages, I winsorize all variables to the first and 99th percentiles to reduce the effect of outliers. The top four rows represent the percentage of pension assets invested in various securities. Many firms invest predominantly in equities and fixed-income securities (medians of 61 percent and 33 percent, respectively). The mean and median ERRs during my sample period are 7.89 percent and 8.1 percent, respectively. The set of firms with DB pensions includes many of the largest firms in the population of all traded firms, with a median (mean) market capitalization of $1.5b ($6.6b). Pension assets and liabilities are economically nontrivial (medians of $125m and $167m, respectively). Aggregate mean equity returns (EQUITY_ RET) are lower than aggregate bond returns (BOND_ RET) during the sample period, with equity returns having higher standard deviations than bond returns-consistent with the notion that equity %EQUITIES, %BONDS, %REAL_ESTATE, and %OTHER are the percentage of pension plan assets invested in equity securities, fixed-income securities (including cash), real estate, and all other unspecified securities, respectively. ERR is the expected rate of return on pension plan assets. (I use the higher of Compustat data item PPROR or PPRORMAX, because PPROR is the simple average assumed rate of return for both domestic and foreign pension plans, whereas PPRORMAX is the highest assumed rate of return. Generally, PPRORMAX applies to the U.S. rate of return). OPER_RISK ¼ standard deviation of the past five years of operating income, scaled by the book value of equity; EQUITY_RET ¼ annual return on the CRSP value-weighted index, measured during the fiscal year; BOND_RET ¼ annual return on the Vanguard Total Bond Index, measured during the fiscal year; ARR ¼ current-year actual dollar return on pension assets scaled by beginning pension assets; ARR_AVG3YEAR ¼ three-year average of ARR, ending in the current year; INTEREST_RATE ¼ monthly interest rate for Moody's AAA-rated corporate bonds obtained from the Federal Reserve; DINTEREST_RATE ¼ change in the interest rate from the beginning of the fiscal year to the end of the fiscal year; EQUITY_RET_EXP ¼ proxy for expected future return, and is measured as the three-year annual return on the CRSP value-weighted index, measured during the three years after the fiscal year-end date; and ERR_LESS_PEER_AVG ¼ firm's ERR minus the median ERR for the same industry, where industry is based on Biddle and Seow (1991) and Mittelstaedt et al. (1995) .
(continued on next page)
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The Accounting Review March 2013 securities are riskier investments than bonds. As expected, when compared to the one-year ARR, the three-year average ARR (ARR_AVG3YEAR) has a lower standard deviation and is less prone to the extreme negative actual returns that are common during my sample period. Before reporting descriptive statistics by year, I discuss the treatment of non-12/31 firms for the purpose of performing analyses by year. As mentioned in Section IV, a complication arises in obtaining an appropriate cross-sectional aggregation of 12/31 firms and non-12/31 firms. SFAS , and so on. As a result, firm-years are defined using SFAS 132R as a reference point. Specifically, firm-years are aggregated such that regardless of the fiscal year-end date, firm-years are grouped together as year 2003 if they are the first year in which SFAS 132R is effective, and grouped together as year 2004 if they are the second year in which SFAS 132R is effective, etc. For the remaining analyses, the year labels refer to the aggregation procedure above. Table 1 , Panel B reports descriptive statistics by year for select variables. For the variables in rows 2 to 10, I bold the year in which the variable is predicted to be affected by managerial responses to SFAS 132R. For the variables in rows 11 to 13, I bold the year in which the variable can potentially affect asset composition or the ERR, even in the absence of managerial responses to SFAS 132R.
Row 1 shows the sample size of firms with the required data necessary to estimate Equation (1) in each year. Rows 2 to 5 show that asset composition is fairly stable across the years. ERRs are also fairly stable over time, as shown in row 6. As discussed earlier, asset composition is chosen at the end of the year, whereas ERRs are chosen at the beginning of the year. Thus, to indicate the year of the predicted managerial response to SFAS 132R, asset composition is bolded in 2003 and ERR is bolded in 2004. Row 7 reports the proportion of firms in any given year that increase, decrease, or do not change their ERRs. Changes in ERR appear to be uncommon, and in the first year of SFAS 132R, 27 percent of firms in my sample reduce their 2004 ERRs. However, the fraction of firms that reduce their ERRs (row 7) and the mean ERR reduction (row 9) in 2002 and 2003 are larger than in Overall, it appears that the results for changes in ERR are weaker than those for changes in equity allocation, as discussed next. Row 8 reports the proportion of firms in any given year that increase, decrease, or do not change their equity allocation. In the first year of SFAS 132R, 76 percent of firms in the sample increased their asset allocation in equities. The magnitude of this proportion is large compared to the other years in the sample period. Rows 9 and 10 show that, in first year of SFAS 132R, firms on average reduced their ERRs and increased their equity allocation. Row 11 shows that the low median ARR_AVG3YEAR of 1.7 percent can contribute to firms' decision to reduce their ERR. Rows 12 to 13 report actual returns to pension assets and stock market index returns, respectively. The median one-year ARR of 17.8 percent and the median stock market index return of 33.1 percent in 2003 can mechanically affect the ending balance in the pension assets held in equities, even in the absence of any active portfolio rebalancing. Thus, these results show the importance of my controls for actual returns and equity index returns in multivariate tests, as discussed later. 2 from the other six years ranges from 20.1 percent to 26.7 percent. Thus, it appears that asset composition has less explanatory power for the ERR before asset composition was required to be disclosed under SFAS 132R. Second, 2002 is the only year in which there is a negative relation between ERR and prior actual returns, suggesting that before SFAS 132R managers likely exercise discretion in choosing ERRs that are not positively correlated with prior actual returns. Third, 2002 is the only year in which the implied expected returns to real estate-or any other category, for that matter-are higher than equities (10.07 . 8.78). This suggests that before SFAS 132R, the differences in implied expected returns to the highest-risk investment category (i.e., equities) versus those to the lower-risk categories do not explain ERRs as well as in the years after SFAS 132R.
Descriptive Analysis of SFAS 132R
In an untabulated analysis, I define an indicator variable POST132R equal to 1 for all years after SFAS 132R (2003 to 2008) , and equal to 0 for 2002, and I interact POST132R with the asset allocation and actual return variables in Equation (1). Results of this test show that the differences in implied expected returns between equity securities and the three other categories become 23 I estimate Equation (1) without an intercept because %EQUITIES, %BONDS, %REAL_ESTATE, and %OTHER add up to 100 percent, such that any one of the asset categories can be expressed as a linear combination of the other three asset categories. In any regression without an intercept, R 2 is redefined and cannot be interpreted in the traditional sense as a measure of explanatory power. Thus, to provide a measure of explanatory power, the R 2 reported in this table is computed from untabulated regressions of a modified version of Equation (1) All variables are defined in Table 1 . SIC indicator variables are included but not tabulated. Industry classification is based on Biddle and Seow (1991) and Mittelstaedt et al. (1995) , and is described in Table 3 The above results are from a pooled regression using all firm-years in 2003-2008 as an estimation period. These parameters are used to compute the variable UNEXPL_ERR, which represents prediction errors in 2002 (the year prior to SFAS 132R) calculated as follows using asset allocation in 2002 and three-year average ARR ending in 2002, where the coefficients denoted with hats are the parameter estimates using the estimation period as reported above: Pre-SFAS 132R ERR minus (â1 3 %EQUITIES þâ2 3 %BONDS þâ3 3 %REAL_ESTATE þâ4 3 %OTHER þâ5 3 ARR_AVG3YEAR).
For example, suppose a firm reports a pre-SFAS 132R ERR of 9 percent, and has a prior three-year average ARR of 10 percent. The firm also reports 60 percent, 20 percent, 15 percent, and 5 percent allocated to Equities, Bonds, Real Estate, and Other, respectively, for 2002. Therefore, UNEXPL_ERR for this firm has a value of 9 À [(8.859 3 60%) þ (6.055 3 20%) þ (6.977 3 15%) þ (5.407 3 5%) þ (0.631 3 10%)] ¼ 1.094. That is, under the model specified in Equation (1), this firm's pre-SFAS 132R ERR of 9 percent is 1.094 percent higher than justified by its asset allocation and prior actual returns, controlling for industry. Standard errors are clustered by firm. SIC indicator variables are included but not tabulated.
statistically larger after SFAS 132R. Overall, the results suggest that after SFAS 132R, there were significant changes in the relation between the ERR and asset composition.
24 Table 2 , Panel B reports the results of estimating Equation (1) using the pooled sample in 2003 to 2008 as a post-SFAS 132R estimation period. The parameters from Table 2 , Panel B are used to compute prediction errors for 2002: the portion of the ERR not explained by asset allocation and prior actual returns (UNEXPL_ERR).
The formal tests of H1 and H2 require additional variables, and the data requirements reduce the sample size. Table 3 , Panel A tabulates the sequential reduction in sample size as a result of each data requirement. Row 1 reports the number of firms with data to estimate Equation (1) Table 3 , Panel B reports the industry composition of three samples of interest: (1) the full initial sample of 887 firms from row 2 in Table 3 , Panel A, (2) the main sample of 768 firms from row 17, and (3) the most restricted final sample of 578 firms in row 18 after requiring all data items. There is minimal industry clustering, with only about a handful of industries representing more than 5 percent of each of the three subsamples. Also, the data requirements do not appear to distort the industry composition of the sample. Table 4 reports the univariate correlations among the variables of interest for the sample of 768 firms from row 17 of Table 3 , Panel A. As preliminary support for H1 and H2, the correlation between UNEXPL_ERR and D%EQUITIES (DERR) is significantly positive (negative). For brevity, I discuss only the Spearman correlations for the control variables with predicted signs. D%EQUITIES is significantly correlated with ARR, EQUITY_RET, and BOND_RET in the predicted directions. DERR is significantly correlated with FIRM_SIZE, DB_SIZE, and ERR_LESS_PEER_AVG in the predicted directions. 24 I perform two untabulated sensitivity tests using interaction terms with the POST132R indicator variable. First, I
re-estimate the equation using a constant sample of firms for which data are available for all years 2002 to 2008. The coefficients and significance levels remain similar. This specification mitigates concerns that results are driven by changes in Compustat coverage, survivorship bias, or self-selection bias. Second, to test whether results for any one single year tend to be systematically different from pooled results for other years, I re-estimate the equation six times after separately redefining the POST132R indicator to equal 1 for all years except 2003, 2004,. . .,2008 , as opposed to setting the POST132R indicator equal to 1 for all years except 2002. Untabulated results from these six regressions show that the coefficients on the interaction terms are generally not significant in these alternative model specifications. These results lend further support that the relation between the ERR and asset allocation in 2002 is different from that in 2003-2008. 25 The loss of firms from row 1 to row 2 is mainly due to some firms' failure to disclose their prior-year asset allocations in the first year of SFAS 132R. Untabulated tests show that there are no statistical differences between the 887 firms that disclose prior-year allocations and the remaining firms that fail to disclose for the following measures: the level of ERR both before and after SFAS 132R, the change in ERR around SFAS 132R, and post-SFAS 132R equity allocation. 26 Untabulated results show that UNEXPL_ERR remains significant in the predicted directions if using the sample of 578 firms in row 18 and including the TAX variable, which is not statistically significant. About 25 percent ((768 À 578)/768) of the firms in row 17 have missing marginal tax rates from John Graham's website. These observations are missing either because the firm is new to Compustat and therefore has insufficient historical data to run the simulation or otherwise has missing data for one or more of the key input variables in the simulation procedure (Graham and Mills 2008) . Graham and Mills (2008, footnote 16) report that 36 percent of their sample firms have missing marginal tax rates obtained from the same source. Firms with Nonmissing TAX 578
The formal tests of H1 and H2 require additional variables, and the data requirements reduce the sample size. This table tabulates the sequential reduction in sample size as a result of each data requirement. Row 1 reports the number of firms with data to estimate Equation (1) The loss of firms from row 1 to row 2 is mainly due to some firms' failure to disclose their prior-year asset allocations in the first year of SFAS 132R. Untabulated tests show that there are no statistical differences between the 887 firms that disclose prior-year allocations and the remaining firms that fail to disclose for the following measures: the level of ERR both before and after SFAS 132R, the change in ERR around SFAS 132R, and post-SFAS 132R equity allocation. The remaining rows above are presented in increasing order of data restrictiveness. To retain sample size, I report main results in Tables 4, 5 , and 6 using the sample of 768 firms in row 17 above without requiring the TAX variable. Untabulated tests using the sample of 578 firms in row 18 above with the TAX variable show that the variable of interest for H1 and H2 (UNEXPL_ERR) remains significant in the predicted directions. Industry classification is based on Biddle and Seow (1991) and Mittelstaedt et al. (1995) . 27 As preliminary support for H1 and H2, Figure 1 shows visual evidence that the pre-SFAS 132R unexplained ERR is (1) positively related to the change in equity allocation and (2) negatively related to the change in ERR.
Main Results for Tests of H1 and H2 Table 5 reports the results of second-stage estimation of Equations (2) and (3). 28 Panel A shows results for a test of H1 using Equation (2). H1 predicts that the coefficient on UNEXPL_ERR . 0. Consistent with H1, the coefficient of 0.030 is significantly positive at p , 0.001, suggesting that firms allocate more pension assets to equities after SFAS 132R to correct the pre-SFAS 132R upward bias in ERRs. Of the control variables with predicted signs, ARR and EQUITY_RET are significant, suggesting that it is important to control for contemporaneous actual pension returns and equity index returns, which can also explain changes in asset allocation in the absence of active pension portfolio rebalancing. While FUNDING has no predicted sign, it is significantly positive, suggesting that firms with better funded pensions on average increase their equity allocations during this period. Table 5 , Panel B reports the results from estimating Equation (3) to test H2, which predicts that the coefficient on UNEXPL_ERR , 0. Consistent with H2, the coefficient is À0.216 (p , 0.001), suggesting that firms with upward biased pre-SFAS 132R ERRs reduce their ERRs after asset allocation disclosures are required. Of the control variables, ARR_AVG3YEAR, FIRM_SIZE, DINTEREST_RATE, EQUITY_RET_EXP, and ERR_LESS_PEER_AVG are statistically significant in the predicted directions, suggesting that prior actual returns, regulatory scrutiny, interest rates, expected future returns, and deviation from the industry average ERR can influence changes in the ERR.
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Results in Table 5 suggest that firms use both reductions in ERR and increases in equity allocation to correct the pre-SFAS 132R bias in ERRs. Significantly positive coefficients on the fitted values in Equations (2) and (3) would provide evidence that the two mechanisms are substitutes. However, the coefficients for DERR_HAT and D%EQUITIES_HAT are not significantly positive. 27 I use the largest sample with the requisite data for this univariate analysis: the 887 firms in row 3 in Table 3 , Panel A. 28 In the first-stage regressions (i.e., D%EQUITIES and DERR regressed on a set of instruments), the following instruments are significantly different from zero when D%EQUITIES is the dependent variable: UNEXPL_ERR, EQUITY_RET, DB_SIZE, and ERR_LESS_PEER_AVG. The following instruments are significantly different from zero when DERR is the dependent variable: UNEXPL_ERR, ARR_AVG_3YEAR, BOND_RET, FIRM_SIZE, DB_SIZE, DINTEREST_RATE, and ERR_LESS_PEER_AVG. The first-stage R 2 s are 20.0 percent and 25.1 percent, respectively. If D%EQUITIES and DERR are simultaneously determined, then only two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates are consistent and efficient (Kennedy 1992 ). An untabulated Hausman (1978) test indicates that D%EQUITIES and DERR are not simultaneously determined. Therefore, as an additional test, I reperform the main tests using OLS instead of 2SLS, since OLS estimates are consistent and efficient in the absence of simultaneity. In the untabulated OLS results, D%EQUITIES_HAT and DERR_HAT are not included, since these variables are computed in the first stage of 2SLS. UNEXLP_ERR remains significant in the predicted directions. As a caveat, I am not able to rule out the possibility that the Hausman test fails to detect simultaneity even if it exists. Therefore, I use 2SLS in Tables 5 and 6 . 29 As a robustness test, I reperform the tests in Table 5 using the 879 firms in row 15 of The unexplained ERR is the prediction error in the year immediately preceding SFAS 132R computed using parameter estimates from regressing ERRs on asset allocations using the post-SFAS 132R years as an estimation period. Changes in %EQUITIES and ERR are measured around SFAS 132R. I form portfolios of 100 observations on the unexplained ERR and plot the mean values of the variables for each portfolio. Units on the vertical axis in Panel A are in the change in percent, not the percentage change. UNEXPL_ERR is the prediction error in the year immediately preceding SFAS 132R computed using parameter estimates from regressing ERRs on asset allocations and ARR using the post-SFAS 132R years as an estimation period. Please see Table 2 , Panel B for the computation of UNEXPL_ERR. FIRM_SIZE is the log of market capitalization. DB_SIZE is the log of the unscaled PBO. See Table 1 (2) and (3) Column I: Delete Pre-SFAS 132R ERRs Greater than 9 Percent Column II: Include an Indicator Variable for Pre-SFAS 132R ERRs Greater than 9 Percent Panel A: Results of Estimating Equation (2) equity allocation after SFAS 132R, but is marginally negative for changes in ERR. Fourth, I delete firms with flat pension schemes where the absolute difference between PBO and ABO is less than 5 percent of PBO (where both PBO and ABO are nonmissing). UNEXPL_ERR remains statistically significant in the predicted directions. Fifth, I restrict the tests to a subsample of firms with overfunded pensions in the first year of SFAS 132R. UNEXPL_ERR remains significantly positive in explaining changes in ERR but is not significant at explaining changes in equity allocation, possibly due to the small sample size of 177 firms with overfunded pensions. Sixth, I restrict the tests to a subsample of firms with underfunded pensions in the first year of SFAS 132R. UNEXPL_ERR remains statistically significant in the predicted directions. Seventh, I estimate Equations (2) and (3) In years other than the first year of SFAS 132R, the coefficient for UNEXPL_ERR is not significant. The finding that the effects predicted by H1 and H2 do not arise in different time periods is consistent with the interpretation that SFAS 132R is responsible for the managerial behavior documented in the first year of SFAS 132R. Finally, using three alternative specifications, I address the possibility that the error term in Equation (3) is not normally distributed. 31 In the first of three specifications, I define a variable that equals 1 if DERR , 0, 2 if DERR ¼ 0, and 3 if DERR . 0. I use this discrete ordered DERR variable in the second-stage, where the hypothesis testing occurs. I use OLS to estimate both the first and second stages. In the second specification, I use the same discrete ordered DERR variable but estimate the second-stage regression using an ordered logistic regression for DERR. In the third specification, I transform both dependent variables. I define an indicator variable that equals 1 if DERR , 0, and 0 otherwise. I define another indicator variable that equals 1 if D%EQUITIES . 0, and 0 otherwise. Results of this specification can be interpreted as a choice study.
32 For these three specifications, the R 2 generally decreases compared to Table 5 , and many of the control variables lose significance, but UNEXPL_ERR remains significant in the predicted directions. Overall, the results in this subsection support the idea that the main results are robust to various specifications.
Supplemental Analysis Using IRS Form 5500
As discussed in Section III, my maintained assumption is that firms react to SFAS 132R despite the fact that, even before SFAS 132R, the IRS required firms with pensions plans covering The purpose of this table is to attempt to isolate the effect of the SEC warning that it would challenge ERRs above 9 percent. In Column I, I delete all observations with pre-SFAS 132R ERRs greater than 9 percent. In Column II, I include the variable ERR.9%, which is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the pre-SFAS 132R ERR is greater than 9 percent, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are the same as in Table 5 . Reported p-values are one-tailed when there are predicted signs. 31 Many firms do not alter their ERRs from year to year, such that many firms have values of zero for the continuous DERR variable. OLS assumes the error term is normally distributed. A distribution of the dependent variable with a concentration at the same value (such as that observed for DERR with a concentration at zero) could potentially result in non-normal errors. If the errors are not normally distributed, then the parameter estimates are consistent but not efficient (Kennedy 1992) , thereby affecting significance tests in hypothesis testing. A common technique to address non-normal error terms is to transform the dependent variable. 32 For ease of interpretation as a choice study, I use these indicator variables and logistic regressions in both the first and second stages.
more than 100 participants to report asset composition on Form 5500. In this section, I investigate whether the SFAS 132R disclosures provide incremental information beyond Form 5500.
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Detailed results are available upon request. I perform several analyses using Form 5500 data, which offer three major takeaways. First, based on untabulated descriptive statistics, most firms do not report data for the individual categories on Form 5500 (i.e., most of the more detailed categories have means and medians of zero). Firms typically report assets in broader categories, such as trusts. Second, based on untabulated regressions of the ERR on Form 5500 asset categories, it is unlikely that financial statement users would be able to judge the reasonableness of the ERR based on the asset allocations reported on Form 5500. Third, I reperform the main tests in Table 5 , except that I compute D%EQUITIES and UNEXPL_ERR using asset allocations from Form 5500. UNEXPL_ERR is not significant in the predicted directions. In summary, while Form 5500 provides useful information about pension asset allocation, SFAS 132R disclosures appear to provide asset composition information that is more accessible and visible.
VI. CONCLUSION
This study examines whether firms alter their behavior in response to changes in accounting standards that mandate new financial statement disclosures. The primary incremental contribution of this study is that firms alter their behavior in response to changes in standards relating merely to disclosure-as opposed to recognition or measurement. Disclosure requirements arguably create less powerful incentives to alter firm decisions than recognition requirements. Finding that new disclosure requirements are enough to induce meaningful changes in firm behavior is compelling evidence in support of the idea that firms do alter their behavior in response to changes in accounting standards.
I examine my research question in the context of defined benefit pensions, which offers an interesting setting with large and economically meaningful effects to study the consequences of FASB accounting standards. In particular, I examine whether firms take actions to more closely align the expected rate of return (ERR) with asset allocation following the mandated asset composition disclosure. Findings suggest that, while it appears that SFAS 132R achieved one of its stated objectives, there were also economic consequences following the issuance of this accounting standard. I find that firms that used upward-biased ERRs prior to SFAS 132R responded to the new standard by increasing asset allocation to equities and/or by reducing ERRs.
Increased allocation to equities in defined benefit pension plans is a particularly interesting economic consequence for two reasons. First, at the firm level, a shift in pension assets toward equities can contribute to a risk mismatch between pension assets and pension liabilities, because pension assets invested in equities have durations and risk characteristics different from those of pension liabilities (Merton 2006) . If there are large stock market losses, such as those in 2008, then pension plans can become severely underfunded. A Mercer Consulting (2009) study estimates that stock market losses left the pension plans of the S&P 1500 firms underfunded by $409 billion as of 33 I obtain machine-readable Form 5500 data from the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College. The IRS collects the Form 5500 data at the plan level, not the firm level. Following prior studies, I aggregate the data to the firm level using the employer identification number (EIN), which is the firm-level equivalent of a social security number. I supplement this process with a manual matching based on firm name and state of incorporation. I then merge the Form 5500 data to Compustat using EINs. As discussed in prior studies, there are difficulties merging Form 5500 with Compustat (Gron and Madrian 2004) . The entity that sponsors the pension could be a controlled subsidiary choosing to file taxes separately from the parent and thus has a separate EIN from the parent, while still remaining consolidated with the parent for financial reporting purposes. As a result, there is a lack of a unique common identifier between Form 5500 and Compustat. I follow the suggestions provided in Gron and Madrian (2004) .
